{"id":2945,"date":"2018-07-18T21:31:02","date_gmt":"2018-07-19T01:31:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/?p=2945"},"modified":"2019-11-01T00:53:11","modified_gmt":"2019-11-01T04:53:11","slug":"book-review-jean-daspremont-international-law-as-a-belief-system","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/es\/book-review-jean-daspremont-international-law-as-a-belief-system\/","title":{"rendered":"BOOK REVIEW: Jean d\u2019Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System"},"content":{"rendered":"
[vc_row][vc_column width=\u00bb2\/3″ css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1447024828222{padding-right: 30px !important;}\u00bb][vc_column_text]By Adrien Habermacher <\/strong><\/strong>[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Cr\u00e9ditos fotogr\u00e1ficos<\/a> <\/em>por Jacqueline Macou<\/em><\/a>[\/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1479081786320{padding: 20px !important;background-color: #efefef !important;}\u00bb][vc_column_text]Abstract<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

In his latest monograph, Jean d\u2019Aspremont argues that the way in which international lawyers think about and practice international law can be perceived as a belief system. This system is based on certain fundamental doctrines, such as sources, responsibility, statehood, interpretation, jus cogens. These doctrines comprise rules and rest on an imagined genealogy. The belief system also relies on self-referentiality to justify its different components, and creates an experienced sense of constraint among international lawyers. d\u2019Aspremont focuses on the discourses in the field of international law to expose their structure and reveal the often fictive connections they entertain with the historical developments that gave birth to them. Despite the complexity of presenting overlapping notions, d\u2019Aspremont offers convincing and well supported claims. Understanding his arguments, however, often requires familiarity with the theoretical debates surrounding certain notions and instruments. Most importantly, previous exposure to the practice of international legal argumentation is necessary to make sense of the author\u2019s assertions. The author does not advocate for radical reform of the way we practice international law; rather, he invites us to suspend our entanglement in this set of beliefs as a reflective exercise. The readers will have to decide for themselves whether this leads them to reform or entrench current international law paradigms. They can, however, seize the analytical tools proposed by d\u2019Aspremont to better understand their own practice, improve the effectiveness of their own practice, and teach the art to the next generation of international lawyers. <\/span><\/p>\n

Translated in French:\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Dans sa plus r\u00e9cente monographie, Jean d\u2019Aspremont soutient que la mani\u00e8re dont les juristes sp\u00e9cialistes en droit international pensent et pratiquent celui-ci peut \u00eatre per\u00e7ue comme un syst\u00e8me de croyances. Ce syst\u00e8me est bas\u00e9 sur certaines doctrines fondamentales, tels que les sources, la responsabilit\u00e9, l\u2019\u00e9tat, l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation, et le jus cogens. Ces doctrines comprennent des r\u00e8gles et s\u2019appuyent sur une g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie imaginaire. Le syst\u00e8me de croyances est aussi bas\u00e9 sur l\u2019auto-r\u00e9f\u00e9rentialit\u00e9 pour justifier ses divers composants, et cr\u00e9e un sentiment de contrainte parmi les juristes du droit international. d\u2019Aspremont met l\u2019accent sur les discours dans le champ du droit international pour en exposer la structure et pour r\u00e9v\u00e9ler les liens souvent fictifs qu\u2019ils entretiennent avec les d\u00e9veloppements historiques qui leur ont donn\u00e9 naissance. Malgr\u00e9 la complexit\u00e9 inh\u00e9rente \u00e0 la superposition de plusieurs notions, d\u2019Aspremont offre des affirmations convaincantes et bien fond\u00e9es. Comprendre ses arguments, cependant, requiert souvent une certaine familiarit\u00e9 avec les d\u00e9bats th\u00e9oriques autour de certaines notions et instruments. Encore plus important, une exposition pr\u00e9alable \u00e0 la pratique de l\u2019argumentation internationale juridique est n\u00e9cessaire pour donner du sens aux affirmations de l\u2019auteur. L\u2019auteur ne pr\u00f4ne pas pour une r\u00e9forme radicale de la mani\u00e8re dont nous pratiquons le droit international; au contraire, il nous invite \u00e0 suspendre notre enchev\u00eatrement dans cet ensemble de croyances comme un exercice r\u00e9flectif. Les lecteurs devront d\u00e9cider par eux-m\u00eames si cela les am\u00e8ne \u00e0 reformer ou confirmer les paradigmes contemporains du droit international. Ils peuvent cependant se saisir des outils analytiques propos\u00e9s par d\u2019Aspremont pour mieux comprendre leur propre pratique, am\u00e9liorer l\u2019effectivit\u00e9 de celle-ci, et enseigner ce savoir-faire aux futures g\u00e9n\u00e9rations de juristes en droit international. <\/span><\/p>\n

Translated in Spanish: <\/span><\/p>\n

En su m\u00e1s reciente monograf\u00eda, Jean d\u2019Aspremont\u00a0 <\/span>se\u00f1ala que la manera en la que los juristas internacionales\u00a0 <\/span>piensan y practican el derecho internacional puede ser percibida como un sistema de creencias. Este sistema est\u00e1 basado en ciertas doctrinas fundamentales, como las fuentes, la responsabilidad, la categor\u00eda de estado, la interpretaci\u00f3n y el jus cogens. Estas doctrinas comprenden ciertas reglas y permanecen en una genealog\u00eda imaginada. El sistema de creencias tambi\u00e9n se basa en una auto-referencialidad con el fin de justificar sus componentes, y crea un permanente sentido de restricci\u00f3n en los juristas internacionales. D\u2019Aspremont se enfoca en los discursos en el campo del derecho internacional para exponer sus estructuras y revelar las frecuentemente ficticias conexiones que ellas presentan con los desarrollos hist\u00f3ricos que les dieron nacimiento. A pesar de la complejidad y de las nociones superpuestas, d\u2019Aspremont ofrece pretensiones convincentes y bien fundadas. Entender sus argumentos requiere sin embargo, de un nivel de familiaridad con los debates te\u00f3ricos que giran en torno a ciertas nociones e instrumentos. A\u00fan m\u00e1s importante, una exposici\u00f3n previa a la pr\u00e1ctica de la argumentaci\u00f3n legal internacional es necesaria para entender las proposiciones del autor. El autor no advoca por una reforma radical de la manera como practicamos el derecho internacional; por el contrario, nos invita a suspender nuestros enredos en este conjunto de creencias como un ejercicio de reflexi\u00f3n. Los lectores tendr\u00e1n que decidir por ellos mismos si el art\u00edculo los lleva a reformar o a afianzar los paradigmas actuales de derecho internacional. Ellos pueden sin embargo, tomar las herramientas anal\u00edticas propuestas por d\u2019Aspremont para entender mejor su propia pr\u00e1ctica, mejorar la efectividad de su propia pr\u00e1ctica, y ense\u00f1ar el arte a la siguiente generaci\u00f3n de juristas internacionales. <\/span><\/p>\n[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column_inner][\/vc_row_inner][mk_divider style=\u00bbpadding_space\u00bb][vc_column_text]\n

Introduction<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n

Sources; responsibility; statehood; interpretation; jus cogens. Anyone with some exposure to the field of international law will recognize here elementary building blocks of the topic. These items, and there might be others, are constitutive elements of international\u00a0 <\/span>law discourses. For those of us more acquainted with the field, they immediately evoke, respectively, Art 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ);[ref] Statute of the International Court of Justice<\/i>, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 art 38(1) (entered into force 24 October 1945).[\/ref] the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States;[ref]Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts<\/i>, GA Res 56\/83, UNGAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A\/RES\/56\/83 (2001).[\/ref]the Montevideo Convention;[ref] Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States<\/i>, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934).[\/ref] Art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT);[ref] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties<\/i>, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 art 31 (entered into force 27 January 1980).[\/ref] Art 53 of the VCLT.[ref] Ibid <\/i>at art 53. [\/ref] We make these immediate and unequivocal connections because we are trained to deploy these tandems together. Moreover, we often refer to the sources and interpretation tandems to justify the use of these few building blocks. This constitutes a system of thought that structures our practice of international law. Furthermore, this system relies on theories that are often closer to founding myths than accurate historical accounts. It is this entire construct that Jean d\u2019Aspremont invites us to reexamine in International Law as a Belief System<\/i>.[ref] Jean d\u2019Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System <\/i>(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) [d\u2019Aspremont, Belief System<\/i>].[\/ref]\n

d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s first steps are to explain the constitutive elements of the belief system he is exposing, namely the fundamental doctrines. He defines their characteristics and conditions of realization, as well as demonstrates the fundamental character of such doctrines in internal legal argumentation (Chapter 2). The author then shows how internal legal argumentation deploys fundamental doctrines, those of sources and interpretation in particular, to explain the existence and function of the fundamental doctrines themselves, which is the inherent self-referentiality of the belief system (Chapter 3). To continue his demonstration, the author focuses on several manifestations of the belief system, such as the use of instruments deemed as formal repositories of the doctrines, and the invention of genealogical connections between such instruments and the doctrine to allow them to play the role of repositories (Chapter 4). Finally, once he has successfully laid out his expository claims and adequately supported them, d\u2019Aspremont invites us to temporarily suspend the previously exposed belief system (Chapter 5). He does not direct us to any specific destination once we accept to set aside the belief system, although he guards against a permanent rejection of it (so-called apostasy).<\/p>\n

In the following, I will summarize and critique d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s International Law as a Belief System<\/i>. I will adopt the same sequential approach as the author: I too will start by spelling out the intertwined expository claims regarding the structure of the belief system and its characteristics. I will also, then, use illustrations to substantiate this analytical framework previously exposed, and show how the author grounds his analysis in the functioning of international legal argumentation. Thirdly, I will expose what would be a suspension of the belief system, consider the consequences of adopting this framework, and analyze the end goal of the author. As a way of conclusion, I will make observations on the terms d\u2019Aspremont chose to present his arguments, and comment on the pedagogical potential of his work.<\/p>\n

Jean d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s expository claims: international lawyers experience international law through fundamental doctrines that they perceive as rules, associate to an imaginary genealogy, and justify by recourse to other fundamental doctrines<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n

At the core of the belief system articulated by d\u2019Aspremont lie the fundamental doctrines. The author attributes three constitutive characteristics to these doctrines: ruleness, imaginary genealogy resting on formal repositories, and self-referentiality. These three characteristics are necessary and cumulative for fundamental doctrines; they are conditions of existence. They are also mutually reinforcing, and there are, therefore, overlaps in their rationale, and definitions.<\/p>\n

The first element is that of ruleness.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 37\u201339.[\/ref] d\u2019Aspremont only gives meager explanations about this characteristic beyond that it \u201crefers here to the need to represent fundamental doctrines as sets of rules\u201d.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 31.[\/ref] For this definition to avoid the pitfall of circular reasoning, it would have been helpful to unpack further what is meant here. Even more since the \u201cexperienced sense of constraint\u201d \u2013 which could have been a way to describe what a rule is or does –\u00a0 <\/span>is analyzed later as a distinct aspect of the belief system emanating from all three characteristics of the fundamental doctrines, rather than attached to ruleness in particular.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 47\u201354.[\/ref] We can only regret the outstanding puzzle about this \u201cprerequisite of the other conditions of realization\u201d.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 38.[\/ref]\n

The second condition of realization and defining characteristic of the fundamental doctrines is the imaginary genealogy.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 39\u201345.[\/ref] International lawyers anchor fundamental doctrines in formal repositories. They create a link, reputedly genealogical, between an instrument and a doctrine. Such instruments can be international conventions, landmark decisions of international tribunals, or even the works of the International Law Commission. Most often, these instruments do not initially come to life for the purpose of serving as such repositories. When that is the case, the genealogy nonetheless erases the competition of powerful interests that crafted them over time. This is why the genealogical link, later created, is fictive. International lawyers imagine this genealogy through an implicit, collective choice to associate a fundamental doctrine to one (and sometimes more) key artefact. While these repositories exist independently of the doctrines and may have binding force on certain states on their own, as is the case for treaties or judicial decisions, they take a much broader meaning in the international legal order than their initial purpose through association with a fundamental doctrine. This choice itself tends to follow the rules contained in certain fundamental doctrines (sources and interpretation), and therefore reinforces the overall system.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the third characteristic is self-referentiality.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 45\u201347, 55\u201370.[\/ref] Fundamental doctrines constitute self-explanatory frameworks. They have the potential to \u201cinvent and dictate their own formation and functioning.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 45.[\/ref] The rules enshrined in the doctrine of sources regulate the making of international rules. The rules enshrined in the doctrine of interpretation regulate how they function. Because the doctrines are perceived as sets of rules, the doctrines regarding the making and interpretation of international rules apply to them. By the same token, once the said rules apply to the fundamental doctrines themselves, it confirms that they are indeed a set of rules. The characteristics of fundamental doctrines are, thus, mutually reinforcing.<\/p>\n

The author\u2019s presentation of self-referentiality, however, needs further explanation. The author treats all fundamental doctrines as part of a single group and does not differentiate among them regarding their characteristics. The \u201cself\u201d prefix here points to the idea that fundamental doctrines, in general, rely on other fundamental doctrines for justification. However, we need to clarify that it is always on the same two fundamental doctrines, namely sources and interpretation, that all fundamental doctrines, including these two, rely on for this purpose. While all the fundamental doctrines share the characteristics the author presents, the doctrines of sources and interpretation occupy a special place in the framework; they are even more fundamental than the other doctrines since they provide justification for all doctrines. While d\u2019Aspremont chose not to introduce such further classification among these doctrines, we need to keep this distinction in mind. Indeed, while the doctrines of statehood or responsibility require recourse to the doctrines of sources and interpretation in the self-referential operation described above, they are themselves unable to provide justification for other doctrines.<\/p>\n

The three characteristics of ruleness, imagined genealogy, and self-referentiality define the fundamental doctrines. International lawyers deploy them in their discourse about international law. International lawyers hear each other speak of the rules pertaining to sources, responsibility, statehood, interpretation, jus cogens; they also hear each other refer to them in association with the corresponding instruments as repositories; they further hear each other justify these fundamental doctrines through the use of other fundamental doctrines in the same terms. Thus, international lawyers repeatedly experience the foregoing system. This experience gives rise to an acceptance of fundamental doctrines as truth in international law.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 47\u201348.[\/ref] International lawyers commit themselves to this structure of thought in international legal argumentation, adopt it, and perpetuate it. The experience of international law discourses generates a sense of constraint toward fundamental doctrines operating as transcendental validators. This is how, according to d\u2019Aspremont, international law can be perceived as a belief system.<\/p>\n

The doctrine of statehood and the Montevideo Convention illustrate how the belief system manifests itself in international law<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n

The foregoing summarized the framework proposed by d\u2019Aspremont in Chapters 2 and 3 to apprehend how international legal argumentation operates. Chapter 4 offers illustrations of how the belief system manifests itself. It provides the reader with historical demonstrations of the imagined character of the genealogical link between fundamental doctrines and formal repositories. It also shows how the belief system creates a justificatory space allowing international lawyers to formulate arguments without the need to endlessly justify their premises. In general, the discussion of \u201cmanifestations of the belief system\u201d anchors the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapters to examples of international legal argumentation. Chapters 2 and 3 only briefly referred to examples and remained largely focused on abstract concepts. The mutually reinforcing characters of many aspects of the author\u2019s theoretical claims warrant this sequential choice. Providing an overview of the entire analytical framework before exploring in depth how it applies to certain objects bypasses the need to justify in advance a point that would be developed later, avoiding unnecessary overlap. Chapter 4 can give substance to the elements previously exposed as it brings together several elements that have already been justified independently of one another. Moreover, this strategy also serves to emphasize the general character of the claims about fundamental doctrines. It highlights how these claims do not depend on the adequacy between the proposed framework and a specific object, but constitute an approach to interpret international legal argumentation generally. It is, thus, harder to reject the overall framework if one finds an object to which it does not apply perfectly, or if the reader does not consider a chosen example to allow for generalization. Although the author\u2019s choice came with the risk of a drier read in Chapters 2 and 3, this tradeoff contributes to the demonstration and serves his arguments.<\/p>\n

The doctrine of statehood is one of the few examples that d\u2019Aspremont develops in Chapter 4.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 79\u201386.[\/ref] The doctrine of statehood comprises the requirements for an entity to be a state in the international system: a permanent population, a permanent territory, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into international relations. While the question of whether to recognize a state has always been a site of fierce competition between regional and global political interests (think of Palestine), states and their international lawyers nonetheless justify their decisions of whether to recognize a state on the basis of the above criteria. d\u2019Aspremont, for instance, points to the written statements that several states submitted to the International Court of Justice in 2009 when it examined the legality of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 80, n 43; see also <www.icj-cij.org\/en\/case\/141\/written-proceedings<\/a>>.[\/ref] This example is convincing, but may not be the strongest available to the author. There are certainly discourses about statehood that display the same pattern outside of judicial proceedings before the ICJ, and such examples would grant greater support for the underlying argument.<\/p>\n

International lawyers anchor this doctrine in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States.[ref] See supra<\/i> note 3.[\/ref] The Montevideo Convention was a regional treaty, negotiated and signed only by states in the Americas.[ref] International Court of Justice, \u201cAccordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion): Written Proceedings\u201d (17 April 2009), online\u00a0 <\/span><www.icj-cij.org\/en\/case\/141\/written-proceedings<\/a>> (The States parties to the Montevideo Convention are Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, and Venezuela).[\/ref] d\u2019Aspremont affirms that it is only in the 1950s and 1960s, an era when decolonization gave birth to many new states, that international lawyers searched for a universal doctrine for recognizing states, and constructed a genealogical link with the Montevideo Convention. He further argues that the drafting history demonstrates that the main focus of this treaty was non-intervention, rather than recognition of states. The imagined genealogy of the universal doctrine of statehood and recognition therefore lies in \u201cthe product of a codification of American public international law on non-intervention.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 86.[\/ref]\n

Lastly, other doctrines justify the validity of the doctrine of statehood contained in the Montevideo Convention. This Convention forms part of international law as it is understood as a set of customary rules. The doctrine of sources, which rests on Art 38 of the ICJ Statute, provides that norms that have acquired a customary status are binding on all states. The VCLT, being itself the repository of the doctrine of interpretation, also contemplates in Art 38 that rules from a treaty can become binding on states that are not a party to the treaty through international custom. These other doctrines justify bypassing the dissonance between, on the one hand, the inherent limited regional reach of the Montevideo due to its treaty nature, and on the other, the universal character of the rules it now provides for.<\/p>\n

International lawyers thus discuss the rules of statehood contained in a doctrine that they have built into international law, via an already existing instrument initially designed for other purposes, and through reliance on other doctrines. The insistence on deploying this doctrine in discourses promoting or rejecting the recognition of new states, rather than pointing to the political advantages of either position, speaks to the sense of constraint that accompanies the doctrine of statehood. International actors acquired this sense of constraint through the experience of being exposed to and practicing international legal discourse in that way. The doctrine of statehood is therefore a manifestation of the belief system constitutive of international legal argumentation.<\/p>\n

d\u2019Aspremont acknowledges that \u201c[m]any international lawyers today question the very modes of legal reasoning put in place by the doctrine of statehood,\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 79.[\/ref] calling for its amendment or even replacement. This does not weaken the claim that it is a fundamental doctrine. On the contrary, it confirms this status. Fierce contestation demonstrates that the doctrine of statehood plays a fundamental role in international legal thought and practice. It is because the doctrine of statehood forms part of the grammar of international law that its content must be modified (or maintained).[ref] See William Sewell, \u201cThe Concept(s) of Culture\u201d in Victoria Bonnell, Lynn Hunt & Richard Biernacki, eds, Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture<\/i> (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999) 35; See also ibid<\/i> (\u201cthe act of contesting dominant meanings itself implies a recognition of their centrality\u201d at 56\u201357).[\/ref] It is one of the components of international law argumentation system based on belief in the ruleness of certain fundamental doctrine, belief in their grounding into a formal repository, and belief in the possibility to justify it by reference to other fundamental doctrines.<\/p>\n

Where do we go from here? Let\u2019s suspend the belief system, reject apostasy, and choose our own path forward<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n

Once d\u2019Aspremont has presented us with this belief system, he invites us to suspend it. We should set aside the inherent self-referentiality of the belief system, and approach the formation and functioning of fundamental doctrines without reference to the doctrine of sources or the doctrine of interpretation.[ref] d\u2019Aspremont, Belief System<\/i>, supra<\/i> note 6 at 104\u201315.[\/ref] This also means setting aside the imagined genealogy. As a result, we could make room in our understanding of international law for the multiple interventions that shaped the doctrine and that the belief system obscures. The making of fundamental doctrines would thus no longer be understood \u201cas a state-centric law-making process\u201d.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 106.[\/ref] Rather, we would come to see the many sites of struggles where a multitude of international lawyers shape the modes of legal reasoning around fundamental international law doctrines. This process is one of \u201cinventing tradition.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i>.[\/ref] State agents purposefully negotiating instruments with the aim of codifying international law into formal repositories are part of this process; \u201cstrong power structures, overarching agendas and hierarchies\u201d play an important role.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 109.[\/ref] Any actor \u201cwho is sufficiently well versed in the modes of legal reasoning recognised and practiced by international legal professionals\u201d nonetheless has the potential to also shape this process.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 108.[\/ref] The functioning of fundamental doctrines would equally appear as a series of uncoordinated interventions \u201cby a great variety of actors involved in international law discourse.\u201d[ref]Ibid<\/i> at 113.[\/ref]\n

Suspending the belief system entails a rupture with formation and interpretation-based self-referentiality. It constitutes an un-learning process. In turn, this allows to reveal the complexity of international law discourse; it streams from a chaotic combination of interventions, some purposeful and some not, by heterogeneous actors advancing disparate interests. This messiness creates, and continuously shapes, how international lawyers think and engage with international law in their argumentative practice. By exposing international law as a belief system, d\u2019Aspremont hopes to make room in our minds for this complex reality. In the author\u2019s words, \u201cthis book is aimed primarily at providing new reflective tools to professionals of international law with a view to allowing them to liberate themselves, albeit temporarily, from inherited patterns of legal thought they have been trained to reproduce and respond to.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 117.[\/ref]\n

Once he has achieved this objective, d\u2019Aspremont, however, refuses to direct us to a preferred outcome. On the contrary, he made \u201cthe choice to abstain from controlling the consequences of the suspension of the international belief system\u201d;[ref]Ibid<\/i> at 117\u201318.[\/ref] this is what he calls his \u201cconsequentialist agnosticism.\u201d[ref]Ibid<\/i> at 118.[\/ref] This does not mean that he refuses to consider potential consequences. Indeed, he acknowledges that his arguments \u201c[come] with a risk\u201d: \u201ca consolidation of the current power structures and forms of violence.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i>.[\/ref] On the other hand, he also affirms that his arguments can at the same time constitute \u201can unprecedent empowerment of reformers.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i>; see also ibid<\/i> at 19.[\/ref] The tone and vocabulary d\u2019Aspremont deploys in mentioning these two opposing scenarios in the epilogue give us some indication that he would prefer the latter over the former. In the introduction, the author gave an even clearer indication of his preference in the following sentence: \u201c[t]he reformist empowerment promoted by the unlearning of the fundamental doctrines accompanying [the] suspension of the belief system is discussed in the Epilogue [\u2026] of this book.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 19.[\/ref] Nonetheless, we must recognize that beyond such clues, he does not engage in a vigorous promotion of either scenario, and leaves this ambition \u201cfor later and for others.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 120.[\/ref] We can see here an attempt to guard the proposed image of international law against two kinds of critiques: if he advocated for a specific end goal, opponents of this particular end goal could easily discard the core of d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s work, approaching international law as a belief system, as an undesirable journey to take given that they do not adhere to the destination itself; on the flip coin, critics could reject the stated end goal if the guiding metaphor did not convince them. d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s affirmation that his arguments \u201c[come] with no transformative urge\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i>.[\/ref] therefore constitute an effective shield to protect the baby when the bathwater gets thrown out.<\/p>\n

However, there remains one exception to d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s consequentialist agnosticism. It lays in the explicit rejection of the possibility of apostasy, that is, a permanent \u201crenunciation by international lawyers of all their current beliefs in terms of modes of legal reasoning.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 121.[\/ref] This is because he deems this possibility neither possible, nor desirable. The author affirms that it would be impossible to fully distance oneself from the \u201ccognitive biases created by the fundamental doctrines.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 20.[\/ref] Moreover, complete rejection of the belief system would mean the collapse of the possibility of communication. There needs to be a set of commonly accepted truths for anyone to deploy any argument without an endless regression of justifications. The author thus argues that in spite of its flaws, getting rid of the belief system would terminate \u201cinternational law as an argumentative practice.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i>.[\/ref] Given that this belief system is what makes discourses about international law possible for advocates of change as well as for proponents of the status quo, neither should wish for its disappearance. This is why the author carefully opted for the term \u201csuspending\u201d rather than \u201cterminating\u201d the belief system.
\nIn rejecting the possibility of apostasy, the author takes a stand regarding the desirability of international law generally. In guarding against what could terminate international law as an argumentative practice, he works from the unspoken assumption that international law ought to exist, and that we ought to be able to communicate about it. d\u2019Aspremont does not address this premise, and does not tell us why international law is itself desirable or necessary. The presence of subtle clues revealing the author\u2019s preference for a reformist agenda that I exposed earlier further undermines the contention that he is indeed agnostic as to the consequences of his arguments. The author still relies on assumptions that are not ethically neutral. Using the idea and vocabulary of \u201cagnosticism\u201d may have been appealing to convince a wider readership, but it is nonetheless an inexact description of his position.<\/p>\n

Closing remarks on the use of vocabulary and the pedagogical potential of d\u2019Aspremont\u2019s approach<\/i><\/strong><\/p>\n

Reading d\u2019Aspremont attentively is also important in order to properly apprehend the nature of his overall argument. The author carefully reminds his readers on numerous occasions that the belief system he proposes is an image rather than \u201can accurate depiction of the inner operation of the international legal discourse.\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 117.[\/ref] Indeed, the title of the book is \u201cinternational law as<\/i> a belief system,\u201d and not \u201cinternational law is<\/i> a belief system\u201d [emphasis added]. Although this phrasing has become a hackneyed clich\u00e9 for a publication title, the author here deploys it wisely since it accurately signals that he is putting forth a metaphor rather than a definition. The depiction of international law as a belief system is not definite; it is one of many possible accounts of how the fundamental tenets of international law are formed, function, and are deployed in legal discourse. The author not only acknowledges this, but goes as far as to state at the outset that his image does not have \u201cany kind of rational or empirical superiority\u201d on competing narratives.[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 3.[\/ref] This breeze of modesty is refreshing in academic writing.<\/p>\n

Another choice of terms throughout the monograph deserves some attention here. In the above review, unsurprisingly, I used the vocabulary found in the book to speak of the analytical framework developed there: for instance, \u201cfundamental doctrines\u201d and \u201cformal repositories.\u201d The book, however, is only the final product of the author\u2019s research and crafting of arguments that had been in the making for some time. The terms the author chose in the monograph and the way he framed his arguments evolved until the final phases of his writing. Reading the book, I was struck by the difference in vocabulary between the written product and the way I had heard the author present the same arguments at a lecture at McGill\u2019s Faculty of Law on 30 March 2016.[ref]Jean d’Aspremont, \u00abMysticism of International Legal Argumentation,\u201d (30 March 2016) (lecture delivered at the Faculty of Law, McGill University, 30 March 2016). For a recording of the lecture, see\u00a0 <\/span>Jean d’Aspremont, \u00abMysticism of International Legal Argumentation,\u201d (30 March 2016), podcast online: Inter Gentes Journal of International Law and Legal Pluralism <www.soundcloud.com\/intergentes\/lecture-by-professor-jean-daspremont<\/a>> and <www.intergentes.com\/interview-with-jean-daspremont<\/a>> [d\u2019Aspremont \u201cMysticism\u201d],.[\/ref] At the time, he presented his project as focused on the \u201cmysticism\u201d of international legal argumentation, and spoke of \u201cgospels\u201d and \u201ccanons\u201d in reference to the doctrines and authoritative texts. The book hardly features such religious vocabulary, with the exception of \u201capostasy.\u201d[ref] See d\u2019Aspremont, Belief System<\/i>, supra <\/i>note 6 at 23\u201324.[\/ref] One needs to search for a footnote in the first chapter to find the author\u2019s admission to previously using such vocabulary in presenting his arguments.[ref] See ibid <\/i>at <\/i>8, <\/i>n 22. [\/ref] The use of this very vocabulary triggered several questions after the lecture; Jean d\u2019Aspremont had to clarify that he was not arguing that international legal argumentation was a theological exercise, and he distanced his claims from Pierre Schlag\u2019s approach to \u201claw as the continuation of God by other means.\u201d[ref] Pierre Schlag, \u201cLaw as the Continuation of God by Other Means\u201d (1997) 85:2 Cal L Rev 427. [\/ref] The gospel and canons analogies must have appeared appealing at first for the author, on the one hand as ways to instigate curiosity for his arguments, and on the other as a tribute to international law\u2019s roots in jus naturalis<\/i> and Christianity. However, it must have also become clear to the author that this way of presenting the arguments raised too many questions, directed the audience\u2019s attention to the analogies rather than the substance of the arguments, and eventually obscured the meaning of the author\u2019s claims. This was so, despite the numerous examples of theological vocabulary used for similar descriptive and analytical purposes in international legal scholarship. In responding to questions after the lecture, Jean d\u2019Aspremont \u2018confessed\u2019 to moving away from the idea of mysticism in his description of the phenomena at play in international legal argumentation, while still describing the core dichotomy as one between gospels and canonical texts.[ref] d\u2019Aspremont, \u201cMysticism\u201d, supra<\/i> note 42 at 0h:49m12s\u20130h:51m:46s.[\/ref] The costs of this \u201cself-serving and purely opportunistic use of vocabulary\u201d[ref] Ibid<\/i> at 0h:47m:45s.[\/ref] proved to be too high in the end, and the author properly chose to sacrifice wordplays for clarity. This anecdote on the genealogy of the book\u2019s vocabulary tells us something about how the \u2018packaging\u2019 of academic arguments matters, and also how the exercise of presenting arguments to peers while the writing of the monograph is still in progress is not (just) indulging in self-promotion, but actually contributes to refining the author\u2019s thoughts and presentation thereof.<\/p>\n

Lastly, this monograph not only represents a great eye-opening moment for international lawyers in terms of better understanding their own practice, it also constitutes an excellent tool for them to teach international legal argumentation. d\u2019Aspremont claims that international lawyers experience the belief system at play, integrate it and perpetuate it. Arguably, most of this happens implicitly, through emulation. It can nonetheless happen explicitly. Those of us engaged in teaching the practice of international law in a variety of ways (delivering lectures, coaching moot court competitions, supervising externships, etc.) can use the framework proposed by d\u2019Aspremont to teach how to structure arguments in international law. This book \u201cis demanding for its readership because it requires a simultaneous familiarity with theoretical debates and literacy in the doctrinal intricacies of the modes of legal reasoning associated with the fundamental doctrines of international law,\u201d[ref] d\u2019Aspremont, Belief System<\/i>, supra<\/i> note 6 at 122.[\/ref] as we can see from the many controversies and explanations relegated to footnotes. I would thus not recommend assigning this book as a reading for beginners in the field. Instructors can nonetheless seize the arguments they will find therein to present to their students how they need to use fundamental doctrines as rules, ground them in specific formal repositories, and rely on the doctrines of sources and interpretation to justify these and other fundamental doctrines in order to practice international legal argumentation. Here, I depart from the consequentialist agnosticism professed by Jean d\u2019Aspremont, and strongly encourage international lawyers to use this revelatory book to better apprehend their own structures of thought and practice, through the suspension of the belief system, in order to better transmit them to the future generation of international lawyers.<\/p>\n[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][vc_column width=\u00bb1\/3″ css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1447025172619{padding-top: 35px !important;padding-right: 35px !important;padding-bottom: 35px !important;padding-left: 35px !important;background: #eae5e1 url(https:\/\/intergentes.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/11\/ricepaper_v3.png?id=691) !important;}\u00bb][mk_button dimension=\u00bbflat\u00bb corner_style=\u00bbrounded\u00bb size=\u00bbmedium\u00bb url=\u00bbhttps:\/\/intergentes.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/2.1.2-habermacher.pdf\u00bb align=\u00bbcenter\u00bb]Download Article (PDF)[\/mk_button][mk_divider style=\u00bbsingle_dotted\u00bb][vc_column_text]\n

Sobre el autor<\/h2>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Adrien Habermacher<\/strong><\/p>\n

Adrien se encuentra completando su tesis doctoral en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad McGill, donde su investigaci\u00f3n se enfoca en el rol de las culturas institucionales en selectas facultades de derecho Canadienses. Adrien detenta un diploma en Arte y un Master en Derecho Econ\u00f3mico de la Universidad Sciences Po (Francia), y tambi\u00e9n estudio en la Universidad de Columbia Britanica (Vancouver), Universidad Columbia (Nueva York) y Universidad Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne (Paris). <\/span><\/p>\n

Adrien Habermacher ha entrenado equipos para la Competencia Jessup International Law Moot por varios a\u00f1os, primero en la Universidad Sciences Po (2015) y luego en la Facultad de Derecho de McGill (2016 a la fecha). <\/span><\/p>\n[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]\n<\/div><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column width=\u00bb2\/3″ css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1447024828222{padding-right: 30px !important;}\u00bb][vc_column_text]By Adrien Habermacher [\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Cr\u00e9ditos fotogr\u00e1ficos por Jacqueline Macou[\/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1479081786320{padding: 20px !important;background-color: #efefef !important;}\u00bb][vc_column_text]Abstract In his latest monograph, Jean d\u2019Aspremont argues that the way in which international lawyers think about and practice international law can be perceived as a belief system. This system is based on certain fundamental doctrines, such as sources, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":2961,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[93],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2945","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-article-es"],"yoast_head":"\nBOOK REVIEW: Jean d\u2019Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System - Inter Gentes<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/es\/book-review-jean-daspremont-international-law-as-a-belief-system\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"es_ES\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"BOOK REVIEW: Jean d\u2019Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System - Inter Gentes\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"[vc_row][vc_column width=\u00bb2\/3″ css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1447024828222{padding-right: 30px !important;}\u00bb][vc_column_text]By Adrien Habermacher [\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]Cr\u00e9ditos fotogr\u00e1ficos por Jacqueline Macou[\/vc_column_text][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner css=\u00bb.vc_custom_1479081786320{padding: 20px !important;background-color: #efefef !important;}\u00bb][vc_column_text]Abstract In his latest monograph, Jean d\u2019Aspremont argues that the way in which international lawyers think about and practice international law can be perceived as a belief system. 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