{"id":2407,"date":"2016-11-13T14:26:12","date_gmt":"2016-11-13T19:26:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/fr\/archive\/"},"modified":"2018-10-24T21:44:33","modified_gmt":"2018-10-25T01:44:33","slug":"archive","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/fr\/archive\/","title":{"rendered":"Archive"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Volume 1 | Issue 1: International Law & Peoples’ Resistance<\/h1>\n[\/vc_column_text][mk_button dimension=\u00a0\u00bbflat\u00a0\u00bb corner_style=\u00a0\u00bbrounded\u00a0\u00bb size=\u00a0\u00bblarge\u00a0\u00bb url=\u00a0\u00bbhttps:\/\/intergentes.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/11\/Inter-Gentes_Issue1_Volume1.pdf\u00a0\u00bb]Download Entire Issue[\/mk_button][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb0″][vc_column_text]\n

Table of Contents<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Foreword<\/a> \u00a0 \u00a0 <\/strong>\u00a0[Download PDF]<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/strong>Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric M\u00e9gret, McGill University<\/span>[\/vc_column_text][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbthin_solid\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]Ultimate Plurality: International Law and the Possibility of Resistance <\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong><\/strong>[Download PDF]<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/strong>Peter Fitzpatrick, Birkbeck, University of London[\/vc_column_text][mk_toggle style=\u00a0\u00bbfancy\u00a0\u00bb title=\u00a0\u00bbSee Abstract\u00a0\u00bb]A formative plurality is identified in the constitution of international law. This plurality embeds resistance yet also blocks it by enabling a neo-imperial enclosing of international law. Ultimately, however, law\u2019s plurality can render the enclosure provisional and secure the possibility of resistance.<\/span><\/p>\n

How much can come
\n<\/span>And much can go,
\n<\/span>And yet abide the World!
\n<\/span>(Emily Dickinson, \u201cThere came a Wind like a Bugle\u201d)<\/span><\/p>\n

French translation<\/em>
\nUne pluralit\u00e9 formatrice est identifi\u00e9e dans la constitution du droit international. Cette pluralit\u00e9 int\u00e8gre la r\u00e9sistance, mais y fait obstacle aussi, en \u00e9rigeant une cl\u00f4ture n\u00e9o-imp\u00e9rial au droit international. \u00a0En fin de compte, cependant, la pluralit\u00e9 du droit peut rendre cette cl\u00f4ture provisoire, afin d\u2019assurer les possibilit\u00e9s de r\u00e9sistance. <\/span><\/p>\n

How much can come
\n<\/span>And much can go,
\n<\/span>And yet abide the World!
\n<\/span>(Emily Dickinson, \u201cThere came a Wind like a Bugle\u201d)<\/span><\/p>\n

Spanish translation<\/em>
\nUna pluralidad formativa es identificada en la constituci\u00f3n del derecho internacional. Esta pluralidad conlleva resistencia, pero tambi\u00e9n la bloquea al avalar una concepci\u00f3n neoimperial del derecho internacional. Sin embargo, al final, la pluralidad del derecho puede llevar esta concepci\u00f3n a la provisionalidad y as\u00ed asegurar una posibilidad de resistencia.<\/p>\n

How much can come
\n<\/span>And much can go,
\n<\/span>And yet abide the World!
\n<\/span>(Emily Dickinson, \u201cThere came a Wind like a Bugle\u201d)<\/span><\/p>\n[\/mk_toggle][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbthin_solid\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]The World\u2019s Citizens Get Involved in Global Policymaking: Global Resistance, Global Public Participation, and Global Democracy<\/a>
\n<\/strong>Otto Spijkers, Utrecht University \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0[Download PDF]<\/a><\/span>[\/vc_column_text][mk_toggle style=\u00a0\u00bbfancy\u00a0\u00bb title=\u00a0\u00bbSee Abstract\u00a0\u00bb]The central question of this contribution is how international policymakers \u2013 mostly States – ought to respond to global protests. There are essentially three ways for them to respond. First, they can refuse these critical world\u2019s citizens the possibility to take part in authoritative policymaking at the global level and essentially leave this to State representatives. The second option is to embrace and welcome the participation of the ordinary citizens in global policymaking. The policymakers might institutionalize the citizens\u2019 involvement, and make their participation an additional element in the process of authoritative policymaking at the global level. The third option is to go even further and replace the inter-State policymaking with a kind of global democracy: a system of representative democracy at the global level. All three scenarios will be explored, with a focus on the second.<\/span><\/p>\n

French translation<\/em>
\nLa question au coeur de cet article est comment les l\u00e9gislateurs internationaux – pour la plupart des \u00c9tats – doivent r\u00e9pondre aux protestations globales. Il y a essentiellement trois fa\u00e7ons d\u2019y r\u00e9pondre. Premi\u00e8rement, ils peuvent refuser aux citoyens et citoyennes du monde critiques la possibilit\u00e9 de prendre part dans l\u2019\u00e9laboration des lois autoritaires sur le plan global et laisser ce r\u00f4le aux repr\u00e9sentants de l\u2019\u00c9tat. La deuxi\u00e8me option est d\u2019accueillir la participation des citoyens ordinaires dans l\u2019\u00e9laboration des lois internationales. La troisi\u00e8me alternative est d\u2019aller encore plus loin et de remplacer la d\u00e9finition des politiques internationales inter\u00e9tatique avec une sorte de d\u00e9mocratie globale : un syst\u00e8me de d\u00e9mocratie repr\u00e9sentative sur le plan global. Les trois sc\u00e9narios seront explor\u00e9s, avec une attention particuli\u00e8re pour le second.<\/p>\n

Spanish translation<\/em>
\nLa pregunta central del art\u00edculo es c\u00f3mo deber\u00edan responder los responsables de la pol\u00edtica internacional – sobre todo, los estado – a las protestas globales. Existen tres formas por las cuales ellos pueden responder. Primero, ellos pueden negar a estos importantes ciudadanos del mundo la posibilidad de tomar parte en el proceso pol\u00edtico al nivel global y fundamentalmente dejar esto a los representantes del estado. La segunda opci\u00f3n consiste en adoptar y acoger la participaci\u00f3n de ciudadanos ordinarios en el proceso pol\u00edtico global. Los legisladores podr\u00edan institucionalizar la participaci\u00f3n ciudadana y hacer de esta participation un elemento adicional al proceso legislativo autoritario al nivel global. \u00a0La tercera opci\u00f3n sugiere ir m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de las otras opciones y reemplazar el proceso pol\u00edtico interestatal por una especie de democracia global: un sistema de democracia representativa a nivel global. Todos los tres escenarios ser\u00e1n explorados, con un enfoque particular al segundo escenario.[\/mk_toggle][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbthin_solid\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]First Nations and the Colonial Project\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong>[Download PDF]<\/a><\/span>\u00a0\u00a0[T\u00e9l\u00e9charger l\u2019article]<\/a>\u00a0 [Descargar art\u00edculo]<\/a><\/p>\n

Irene Watson, University of South Australia[\/vc_column_text][mk_toggle style=\u00a0\u00bbfancy\u00a0\u00bb title=\u00a0\u00bbSee Abstract\u00a0\u00bb]The colonial project has embodied a centuries-long, ongoing campaign to annihilate, define, subordinate and exclude the \u2018native\u2019, and an arsenal of tools has been applied to these ends. Mast-headed with the Christian mission to \u2018civilise\u2019, First Nations laws were deemed non-existent and, for more than 500 years, the colonialist construct of an absence of law in First Nations\u2019 territories was supported by its idealised notions about the \u2018savage\u2019 and \u2018backward native\u2019. European constructs of backwardness and savagery continue to prevail in contemporary times, but First Nations continue to survive, live, practice and assert a lawful way of being in the world, one which is different to the European way of being, but no less valid and perhaps more critical to the future of life on earth.<\/span><\/p>\n

Many appeals made for recognition under international law by First Nations have failed because international law has been created by colonial nations and in the interests of colonialism itself. International law grew out of the distinctions made between civilized and non-civilized states, and those distinctions confirmed that international law applied only to a civilized \u2018family of nations\u2019. Anghie argues that colonialism was not an example of the application of sovereignty, but that sovereignty was constituted through colonialism. With the shaping of international law by colonialism, we are left to consider the question: is it possible to reconstruct international law so that it is liberated from its colonial origins? The subject is made more complex by the fact of the many First Nations confined to the \u2018domestic paradigm\u2019, immersed within an occupying settler state, and the state policies which aim at their complete annihilation. This paper will explore the possibility of freedom beyond the domestic paradigm and the absorption of First Nations into the universal \u2018civilization\u2019 of Europe.<\/span><\/p>\n

Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the nations and states of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of European origin.
\n(From nineteenth century writer Henry Wheaton)<\/span><\/p>\n

French translation<\/em>
\nLe projet colonialiste repr\u00e9sente une campagne de plusieurs si\u00e8cles pour annihiler, d\u00e9finir, subordonner et exclure \u00ab l\u2019autochtone \u00bb, et un arsenal d\u2019outils a \u00e9t\u00e9 employ\u00e9 \u00e0 ces fins. Percut\u00e9es par la mission civilisatrice du Christianisme, les lois autochtones \u00e9taient consid\u00e9r\u00e9es non-existantes , et pour plus de 500 ans, la construction colonialiste de l\u2019absence de droit chez les autochtones a \u00e9t\u00e9 nourrie par des notions id\u00e9alis\u00e9es du \u00ab sauvage \u00bb et de \u00ab l\u2019autochtone arri\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00bb. Les conceptions europ\u00e9ennes du sous-d\u00e9veloppement et de la barbarie persistent dans l\u2019\u00e9poque contemporaine, mais les peuples autochtones continuent de survivre, vivre, pratiquer et revendiquer une mani\u00e8re l\u00e9gale d\u2019exister, une qui est diff\u00e9rente \u00e0 la mani\u00e8re d\u2019\u00eatre europ\u00e9enne, sans \u00eatre moins valide et en \u00e9tant peut-\u00eatre plus critique de l\u2019avenir de la vie sur Terre.<\/span><\/p>\n

Plusieurs revendications autochtones pour la reconnaissance sous le droit international ont \u00e9chou\u00e9es car le droit international a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9 par des \u00e9tats colonisateurs selon les int\u00e9r\u00eats du colonialisme. Le droit international s\u2019est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 \u00e0 partir des distinctions entre les \u00c9tats civilis\u00e9s et les \u00c9tats non-civilis\u00e9s, et toutes ces distinctions ont confirm\u00e9 que le droit international s\u2019applique seulement aux familles \u00ab des nations civilis\u00e9es \u00bb. Anghie \u00a0avance que le colonialisme n\u2019\u00e9tait pas un exemple de l\u2019application de la souverainet\u00e9, mais que la souverainet\u00e9 s\u2019est constitu\u00e9e \u00e0 travers le colonialisme. Avec l\u2019influence formatrice du colonialisme sur le droit international, nous devons nous demander : serait-il possible de reconstruire le droit international de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 ce qu\u2019il s\u2019affranchisse de ses origines coloniales? Le sujet devient plus complexe par le fait que plusieurs populations autochtones \u00a0sont enclav\u00e9es dans le \u00ab paradigme domestique \u00bb, immerg\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019int\u00e9rieur d\u2019un \u00c9tat-occupant, ainsi que dans des politiques qui visent leur annihilation. Cet article explorera la possibilit\u00e9 de la libert\u00e9 au-del\u00e0 du paradigme domestique et de l\u2019absorption des peuples autochtones dans la \u00ab civilisation \u00bb universelle de l\u2019Europe.<\/span><\/p>\n

Y a-t-il un droit uniforme des nations? Il ne s\u2019agit certainement pas du m\u00eame pour toutes les nations et \u00e9tats de ce monde. Le droit public, \u00e0 quelques exceptions pr\u00e8s, a toujours \u00e9t\u00e9, et l\u2019est encore, limit\u00e9 aux peuples civilis\u00e9s et chr\u00e9tiens de l\u2019Europe ou ceux d\u2019origine europ\u00e9enne.
\n<\/span>(De Henry Wheaton,\u00a0\u00e9crivain du\u00a0XIXe si\u00e8cle,\u00a0notre traduction<\/span>)<\/p>\n

Spanish translation<\/em>
\nEl proyecto colonial ha encarnado por un siglo campa\u00f1as de aniquilaci\u00f3n, subordinaci\u00f3n y exclusi\u00f3n \u201cnativa\u201d, y un arsenal de herramientas ha sido empleado para estos fines. \u00a0Encabezado por la misi\u00f3n cristiana de \u201ccivilizar\u201d, las leyes de las primeras naciones fueron consideradas inexistentes, y por m\u00e1s de 500 a\u00f1os, la explicaci\u00f3n colonialista de la ausencia de la ley en dichos pueblos ind\u00edgenas fue respaldada por esa idealizada noci\u00f3n del pueblo ind\u00edgena como un pueblo \u201csalvaje\u201d y \u201catrasado\u201d. Ideales Europeos de retraso y salvajismo permanecieron en la era contempor\u00e1nea, pero los pueblos ind\u00edgenas contin\u00faan sobreviviendo, practicando y afirmando una medio legal de pertenecer al mundo en una manera diferente al modo de ser Europeo, pero no menos v\u00e1lido y quiz\u00e1s m\u00e1s cr\u00edtico con relaci\u00f3n al futuro de la vida sobre la tierra. <\/span><\/p>\n

Muchas demandas por el reconocimiento de las leyes internacionales realizadas por los pueblos ind\u00edgenas han fallado, debido a que el derecho internacional ha sido creado por naciones colonizadoras con fines de colonialismo. El derecho internacional creci\u00f3 basado en la distinci\u00f3n de estados civilizados y no civilizados, y esas distinciones confirman que el derecho internacional ha sido creado para naciones civilizadas, o la \u201cfamilia de naciones\u201d. \u00a0Anghie sostiene que el colonialismo no es un ejemplo de la aplicaci\u00f3n de soberan\u00eda, sino que esa soberan\u00eda se construy\u00f3 a trav\u00e9s del colonialismo. Con la organizaci\u00f3n del derecho internacional resultando del colonialismo, dejamos en consideraci\u00f3n la pregunta siguiente: es posible reconstruir el derecho internacional y liberarlo de sus or\u00edgenes coloniales? El asunto resulta m\u00e1s complejo por el hecho de que muchos pueblos ind\u00edgenas se encierran en \u201cparadigmas dom\u00e9sticos\u201d, inmersos en un estado colonial y en pol\u00edticas de estado, cuyo objetivo es la aniquilaci\u00f3n completa de estos pueblos. Este art\u00edculo explorar\u00e1 las posibilidades de libertad m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de paradigmas dom\u00e9sticos y la asimilaci\u00f3n de los pueblos ind\u00edgena dentro una dicha \u201ccivilizaci\u00f3n\u201d universal europa. <\/span><\/p>\n

Existe un derecho uniforme de naciones? Es cierto que no existe un mismo derecho para todas las naciones y los estados del mundo. El derecho p\u00fablico, con leves excepciones, siempre ha sido, y a\u00fan queda reservado a personas \u201ccivilizadas\u201d, entendidas como Cristianos europeos o gente originaria de Europa.\u00a0(Del autor del siglo XIX, Henry Wheaton, a 54. Nuestra traducci\u00f3n)<\/span><\/p>\n[\/mk_toggle][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbthin_solid\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]Resistance and International Law; De-coloniality and Pluritopic Hermeneutics<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong>[Download PDF]<\/a><\/span>
\n<\/strong>Pierre-Alexandre Cardinal, McGill University[\/vc_column_text][mk_toggle style=\u00a0\u00bbfancy\u00a0\u00bb title=\u00a0\u00bbSee Abstract\u00a0\u00bb]The purpose of this essay will be to engage with the concept of resistance, and to try to map some of the aspects of its relationship with international law. The question that animates the endeavour is that of the capacity of international law to provide sufficient perspective to give a cognizant account of the phenomenon of resistance. My hypothesis is that international law, stemming from European modernity, suffers from irredeemable methodological and epistemic biases that rely on the pre-eminence of the state form in the discipline. Such biases, I argue, produce exclusionary mechanisms inherent to the structure of the discipline, and create distortions of reality along the modern\/colonial divide. These distortions enforce a persistent structure or matrix of coloniality that contributes to the ontological negation of the \u201cdamn\u00e9\u201d, i.e. the dominated Other who is in a position of resistance. This matrix is defined as a threefold interrelating set of dominations, it includes: a coloniality of power, the interrelation of modern forms of direct domination; a coloniality of knowledge, the control of different areas of knowledge production; and a coloniality of Being engendered by the interrelation of the previous two. It creates a situation of resistance that international law, because of its epistemic and methodological biases, cannot rationalize completely because of the resistant\u2019s departure from the schemes of knowledge of modernity in which the discipline is rooted, and his willingness to negotiate power and not only completely negate it. This resistance by the dominated Other, I will suggest, is a counter-normative response to the distortions created by the matrix of coloniality in international law.<\/span><\/p>\n

French translation<\/em>
\nCet article s\u2019interroge sur le concept de \u201cr\u00e9sistance\u201d et cherche \u00e0 mieux comprendre sa relation avec le droit international. La question de savoir si le droit international a la capacit\u00e9 d\u2019apporter une perspective suffisante pour comprendre le concept de r\u00e9sistance est \u00e0 l\u2019origine de cette analyse. Mon hypoth\u00e8se est que le droit international, compte tenu de ses racines dans la modernit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne, souffre de biais m\u00e9thodologiques et \u00e9pist\u00e9mologiques irr\u00e9versibles bas\u00e9s sur la pr\u00e9\u00e9minence de la forme \u00e9tatique dans la discipline. J\u2019avance que ces biais produisent des m\u00e9canismes d\u2019exclusion inh\u00e9rents \u00e0 la discipline, et cr\u00e9ent une distorsion de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 selon une division moderne \/ coloniale. Ces distorsions renforcent un structure persistance, ou une matrice de colonialit\u00e9 contribuant \u00e0 la n\u00e9gation ontologique du \u201cdamn\u00e9\u201d, c\u2019est \u00e0 dire, l\u2019Autre domin\u00e9 en position de r\u00e9sistance. Cette matrice comprend trois axes qui s\u2019entrecoupent : la colonialit\u00e9 du pouvoir (les diff\u00e9rentes formes de domination directe) ; la colonialit\u00e9 du savoir (le contr\u00f4le des diff\u00e9rents modes de production du savoir) ; et la colonialit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00catre, engendr\u00e9e par l\u2019intersection des deux axes pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents. Ceci cr\u00e9e une situation de r\u00e9sistance que le droit international, \u00e0 cause de ses biais \u00e9pist\u00e9mologiques et m\u00e9thodologiques, ne peut enti\u00e8rement rationaliser \u00a0car le r\u00e9sistant s\u2019\u00e9carte des sch\u00e9mas de savoir sur lesquels la disciplines est fond\u00e9e et est dispos\u00e9 \u00e0 n\u00e9gocier le pouvoir sans compl\u00e8tement le nier. \u00a0Cette r\u00e9sistance de l\u2019Autre domin\u00e9, je sugg\u00e8re, est une r\u00e9ponse contre-normative aux distorsions cr\u00e9es par la matrice de colonialit\u00e9 en droit international. <\/span><\/p>\n

Spanish translation<\/em>
\nEl presente art\u00edculo se enfocar\u00e1 en el concepto de resistencia, con el intento de delinear algunos aspectos de la relaci\u00f3n entre este concepto y el \u00e1mbito del derecho internacional. La pregunta que motiva este trabajo consiste en contemplar la capacidad del derecho internacional de proveer una perspectiva suficientemente informada por el fen\u00f3meno de resistencia. Mi hip\u00f3tesis se basa en que el derecho internacional, que emana de la modernidad europea, sufre una parcialidad metodol\u00f3gica y epist\u00e9mica, la cual se funda en la preeminencia del estado dentro esta disciplina. Argumento que esta inclinaci\u00f3n produce mecanismos excluyentes inherentes a la estructura de la disciplina, y crea distorsiones de la realidad que se suman a la divisi\u00f3n moderna\/colonial. Estas distorsiones refuerzan una matriz de colonialismo persistente que contribuye a la negaci\u00f3n ontol\u00f3gica del \u00ab\u00a0damn\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb, es decir, del otro dominado que se encuentra en posici\u00f3n de resistencia. Esta matriz es definida como un conjunto trif\u00e1sico de dominaci\u00f3n; incluye un poder de colonialismo, definido como la interrelaci\u00f3n de formas modernas de dominaci\u00f3n directa; un colonialismo de conocimiento, entendido como el control de las diferentes \u00e1reas de producci\u00f3n del conocimiento; y un colonialismo de \u00ab\u00a0ser\u00a0\u00bb , debido a la interrelaci\u00f3n de los anteriores. Esto crea una situaci\u00f3n de resistencia que el derecho internacional, debido a su parcialidad epist\u00e9mica y metodol\u00f3gica, no puede racionalizar completamente gracias a la desviaci\u00f3n de los resistentes de los esquemas de conocimiento de la modernidad en los cuales la disciplina encuentra sus fundamentos, \u00a0as\u00ed como su predisposici\u00f3n para negociar el poder y no negarlo completamente. Sugerir\u00e9 que esta resistencia es una respuesta contra normativa a las distorsiones creadas por la matriz del colonialismo en el derecho internacional.<\/span>[\/mk_toggle][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_bottom=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]We the People: Self-Determination v. Sovereignty in the Case of De Facto States<\/a> \u00a0 \u00a0<\/strong>[Download PDF]<\/a>
\n<\/strong><\/span>Jan Wouters and Linda Hamid, KU Leuven[\/vc_column_text][mk_toggle style=\u00a0\u00bbfancy\u00a0\u00bb title=\u00a0\u00bbSee Abstract\u00a0\u00bb]On 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. Soon thereafter, the United States, as well as a host of other States, formally recognized Kosovo. The recognition of Kosovo\u2019s statehood by a majority of Western Powers has sparked renewed hopes of independence for a number of de facto States. Yet, the countries that have recognized Kosovo\u2019s independence argue that this is a \u2018unique\u2019 case. But is Kosovo really a one-off? De facto States too, either implicitly or explicitly, claim a right to self-determination that includes secession as a remedy. So why is it then that the people of Kosovo have been able to attain independent statehood, whereas the people of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Transnistria have not? Our contribution will explore this question by looking at how this divergent practice has reshaped the contours of the modern-day right to self-determination and, thereby, it will also extrapolate the current criteria that a people must meet in order to obtain independence.<\/span><\/p>\n

French translation<\/em>
\nLe 17 f\u00e9vrier 2008, le Kosovo a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 son ind\u00e9pendance de la Serbie. Peu apr\u00e8s, les \u00c9tats-Unis, ainsi que d\u2019autres \u00c9tats, ont reconnu formellement l\u2019\u00c9tat du Kosovo. La reconnaissance du statut \u00e9tatique du Kosovo par une majorit\u00e9 de pouvoirs occidentaux a r\u00e9veill\u00e9 les espoirs renouvel\u00e9es de nombreux \u00c9tats \u201cde fait\u201d. Or, les \u00c9tats qui ont reconnu l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance du Kosovo pr\u00e9tendent qu\u2019il s\u2019agit ici d\u2019un cas \u201cunique\u201d. Mais le Kosovo est-il r\u00e9ellement un cas exceptionnel? Les \u00c9tats de fait aussi, implicitement ou explicitement, revendiquent un droit \u00e0 l\u2019autod\u00e9termination \u00a0incluant la s\u00e9cession comme un rem\u00e8de. Ainsi, pourquoi est-il que le peuple du Kosovo a pu atteindre l\u2019autod\u00e9termination, alors que les peuples de l\u2019Abkhazie, de l\u2019Oss\u00e9tie du Sud, du Haut-Karabakh ou de la Transnistrie, ne l\u2019ont pu obtenir? Cette contribution explorera cette question en regardant comment cette pratique divergente a d\u00e9fini les contours du droit moderne \u00e0 l\u2019autod\u00e9termination et tentera ensuite d’extrapoler les crit\u00e8res actuels qu\u2019un peuple doit satisfaire afin d\u2019obtenir l\u2019ind\u00e9pendance. <\/span><\/p>\n

Spanish translation<\/em>
\nEl 17 de febrero de 2008, Kosovo declar\u00f3 su independencia de Serbia. Poco despu\u00e9s, los Estados Unidos, as\u00ed como una serie de otros Estados, reconocieron formalmente el Estado de Kosovo. El reconocimiento de la condici\u00f3n de Estado de Kosovo por la mayor\u00eda de las potencias occidentales despert\u00f3 esperanzas renovadas de independencia de una serie de Estados \u201cde facto\u201d. Sin embargo, los Estados que han reconocido la independencia de Kosovo argumentaron que se trataba de un caso \u00ab\u00a0\u00fanico\u00a0\u00bb. Pero es realmente Kosovo un caso excepcional? De hecho, los Estados de facto tambi\u00e9n reclaman, de manera impl\u00edcita o expl\u00edcita, el derecho a la libre determinaci\u00f3n que incluye la secesi\u00f3n como remedio. Entonces \u00bfc\u00f3mo es que el pueblo de Kosovo ha sido capaz de alcanzar un Estado independiente, mientras el pueblo de Abjasia, Osetia del Sur, Nagorno-Karabaj, Transnistria no puede? Nuestra contribuci\u00f3n explorar\u00e1 esta cuesti\u00f3n, examinando c\u00f3mo esta pr\u00e1ctica ha reconfigurado los contornos del derecho a la libre determinaci\u00f3n y, por lo tanto, tambi\u00e9n extrapolar\u00e1 los criterios actuales que un pueblo debe cumplir a fin de obtener la independencia.<\/span>[\/mk_toggle][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u00a0\u00bb.vc_custom_1517622292931{padding-top: 30px !important;}\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row id=\u00a0\u00bbtoc\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column css=\u00a0\u00bb.vc_custom_1477366240977{padding: 35px !important;background-color: #f2f2f2 !important;}\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column_text]\n

Pre-Issue Article<\/h1>\n[\/vc_column_text][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb0″][vc_column_text]Cosmopolitan Normative Information: Patrick Glenn\u2019s Legal Theory<\/a>
\nRichard Janda<\/b>, McGill University[\/vc_column_text][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_bottom=\u00a0\u00bb10″][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_bottom=\u00a0\u00bb10″][mk_social_networks size=\u00a0\u00bbxx-large\u00a0\u00bb style=\u00a0\u00bbcircle\u00a0\u00bb margin=\u00a0\u00bb10″ icon_color=\u00a0\u00bb#ffffff\u00a0\u00bb icon_hover_color=\u00a0\u00bb#49a09b\u00a0\u00bb align=\u00a0\u00bbcenter\u00a0\u00bb facebook=\u00a0\u00bbhttps:\/\/www.facebook.com\/mcgill.intergentes\u00a0\u00bb twitter=\u00a0\u00bbhttps:\/\/twitter.com\/intergentes\u00a0\u00bb linkedin=\u00a0\u00bbhttps:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/company\/inter-gentes\u00a0\u00bb][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row][vc_column][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]\n<\/div><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb0″ margin_bottom=\u00a0\u00bb40″][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row id=\u00a0\u00bbtoc\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column css=\u00a0\u00bb.vc_custom_1477366240977{padding: 35px !important;background-color: #f2f2f2 !important;}\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column_text] Volume 1 | Issue 1: International Law & Peoples’ Resistance [\/vc_column_text][mk_button dimension=\u00a0\u00bbflat\u00a0\u00bb corner_style=\u00a0\u00bbrounded\u00a0\u00bb size=\u00a0\u00bblarge\u00a0\u00bb url=\u00a0\u00bbhttps:\/\/intergentes.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/11\/Inter-Gentes_Issue1_Volume1.pdf\u00a0\u00bb]Download Entire Issue[\/mk_button][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb0″][vc_column_text] Table of Contents Foreword \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0[Download PDF] Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric M\u00e9gret, McGill University[\/vc_column_text][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbthin_solid\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]Ultimate Plurality: International Law and the Possibility of Resistance \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0[Download PDF] […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2407","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"yoast_head":"\nArchive - 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Inter Gentes","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/fr\/archive\/","og_locale":"fr_FR","og_type":"article","og_title":"Archive - Inter Gentes","og_description":"[vc_row][vc_column][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb0″ margin_bottom=\u00a0\u00bb40″][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row id=\u00a0\u00bbtoc\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column css=\u00a0\u00bb.vc_custom_1477366240977{padding: 35px !important;background-color: #f2f2f2 !important;}\u00a0\u00bb][vc_column_text] Volume 1 | Issue 1: International Law & Peoples’ Resistance [\/vc_column_text][mk_button dimension=\u00a0\u00bbflat\u00a0\u00bb corner_style=\u00a0\u00bbrounded\u00a0\u00bb size=\u00a0\u00bblarge\u00a0\u00bb url=\u00a0\u00bbhttps:\/\/intergentes.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/11\/Inter-Gentes_Issue1_Volume1.pdf\u00a0\u00bb]Download Entire Issue[\/mk_button][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbpadding_space\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb0″][vc_column_text] Table of Contents Foreword \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0[Download PDF] Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric M\u00e9gret, McGill University[\/vc_column_text][mk_divider style=\u00a0\u00bbthin_solid\u00a0\u00bb margin_top=\u00a0\u00bb10″][vc_column_text]Ultimate Plurality: International Law and the Possibility of Resistance \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0[Download PDF] […]","og_url":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/fr\/archive\/","og_site_name":"Inter Gentes","article_modified_time":"2018-10-25T01:44:33+00:00","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e":"18 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/fr\/archive\/","url":"https:\/\/intergentes.com\/fr\/archive\/","name":"Archive - 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